This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of ontology thus as it is used in computing science. It identifies three main problems with such a concept, two of which are intrinsic to it and one of which is extrinsic, so to speak, being related to the use of ontology in applications.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper (the lifting-cum-paraphrase of whose title I hope St. Thomas Aquinas will forgive) is to analyze the foundations and the value (in a rather broad sense) of what today is commonly known, among researchers and practitioners of information systems, as ontology. I will make three arguments: the first two will be endemic to computing science, while the third will be of a broader nature, and will consider the relation between the ontological offering of computing science and the general environment in which this offering is fluorishing. Of the two endemic arguments, the first will be of a formal nature, viz. an investigation on the existence of an acceptable definition of ontology, while the second will be of a more theoretical nature, so to speak, dealing with the common assumption that ontology can be used to formally specify the semantics of a certain domain of discourse. This division can be seen, mutatis mutandi, as a mirror of the linguistic division into which ontology would locate itself: the first section (the one on the definition of ontology) deals with its syntax ; the second section deals with the semantics of ontology, and the third with the way ontology is applied in disciplines outside of computing science, that is, it deals with the pragmatics of ontology.
Before taking on these subjects, however, I should like to take a little space to settle, once and for all, a terminological matter. The word ontology originates in metaphysics where it is, according to the Enciclopaedia Britannica, the study of Being as such, i.e. of the basic characteristics of all reality.
Ontology, as defined in metaphysics, is the study of Being, not of beings : it is not a taxonomy of existing things: Linneus (just to make an example) never claimed to be doing ontology, and quite correctly so. It is true that John Scot's De divisionis Naturae is generally regarded as an ontological work, but this is due to its Platonic assumption of the universals as the only reality, and not to the taxonomical structure of the work per se. For a card-carrying Platonist, of course, a structural description of the universals is an ontological work, since the universals constitute the Being. But if you are a nominalist (and you probably must be if you are working on computing ontology), a taxonomy of your terms has nothing ontological to offer.
The word "ontology" ends with the suffix -logy and---because of the programmatic rather than methodological connotation of the suffix in this case---it has no plural: there are no different studies of Being as such; any way of studying it is part of the same discipline of ontology. The Oxford English Dictionary, quite correctly, doesn't report any plural for the word ontology.
In computing, the word ontology is used with two different connotations: as a discipline and as the artifacts that the discipline produces. While the term ontology is usable (by an admittedly rather daring metaphorical extension) in the first case, using it as a name for the artifact is clearly improper: a better name in this case would be ontonomy (plural ontonomies ) 1 . In this paper, I will keep the distinction and refer to the discipline as ontology and to the artifact as ontonomy.
Some readers might see into all this the expression of too fine a pont, an empty 1 Quite surprisingly (to me, at least), this is not a neologism. The term was used in 1803 by J. Stewart in his Opus Maximum as a synonym, more or less, of ontology. Given its derivation from oντ oς, (present participle of to be) and νoµια, (distribution, arrangement ), I think that my connotation is better than Stewart's. A more appropriate name, with less metaphysical baggage, would be (from oικoς, household ) the word economy but, as the readers undoubtedly know, the term is already used for an altogether different discipline.
pseudo-intellectualistic divertissment, but I disagree quite emphatically with any such assessment: computing is a mathematical discipline, and precision in the terms that one uses is of the greatest importance to it, the unwanted connotations of a term often leading to confusion. Since confusion is precisely what I ascribe the existence of computational ontology to, it is important to try to avoid falling into easy connotational pitfalls, the risk of pedantry being in any case preferrable to that of imprecision.
SYNTAX
Given the almost panacean importance that these days is ascribed to ontology for the solution of many an information management problem, it is surprisingly hard to come across a mathematically acceptable definition of the discipline or of its artifacts. The most common definition or, at least, the one whose variants and offspring I seem to stumble upon with alarming frequency can be traced back to Uschold & Gruninger (1996) :
[an ontonomy is] an explicit account of a shared understanding (emphasis in the original; see, for example, Gruber (1993) ; Wache et al. (2001) ; Fensel et al. (2001) ). There is more than a fair share of reasons why a computing scientist could feel entitled, if not to cringe, at least to frown looking at this definition. The first thing that one notices is the curious presence of the word shared, which Uschold and Gruninger consider so important as to grace it with italicization. The word, in this context, is curious indeed. Why on God's green earth can't I create an ontonomy just for myself? What is that magic thing that happens to an artifact at the moment of sharing that makes it an ontonomy? Looking at the definition it sesms that if I write down a series of logic axioms for myself they are just that: axioms, but if I send them to my friend Drew to make sure that we agree on them they become, ipso facto, an ontonomy. Curioser and curioser. The rôle of the word understanding is not any clearer. What exactly is an understanding? Is it what businessmen reach after a preliminary negotiation? Is it what the Godfather seeks when he makes somebody "an offer they can't refuse"? Unless we have a clear definition of understanding, this definition of ontonomy is vacious.
But the most serious problem of Uschold and Gruninger's definition is its logical form. The definition is functional, or teleological: it doesn't specify what an ontonomy is (the way a structural definition would do), but what it is (generally) used for. Definition of this kind and unacceptable in mathematics in general and in computing science in particular. Consider, as a parallel, the definition of formal grammar: if researchers in programming languages had used the same criteria of rigor (or lack thereof) as researchers in ontology, the definition of a formal grammar would sound something such as: a formal grammar is the specification of a programming language.
Any programming language theoretician worth her salary would find this definition unacceptable. While computing scientists do use formal grammars for the definition of programming languges, there is no reason why this should be their only use. Linguists (at least those adhering to the Chomskyan current of the Anglo-American philosophy of language) use it to describe parts of natural language, and there is no reason why other uses should not be found. Finding new uses will not change the nature of the artifact, but will invalidate functional definitions such as the one given above. A functional definition describes the use of an artifact, but it doesn't specify its nature and structure, how we can identify it:
given a mathematical object, a definition should allow one to determine whether the object is a formal grammar or not. To this end, a structural definition is necessary. In the case of formal grammar, the definition is the well known one: a formal grammar is a 4-tuple (N, T, S, P ), where N is a finite set (called the set of non-terminals), T is a finite set, disjoint from N (called the set of terminals), P is a set of productions, that is---for context-free grammars---of pairs (α, β) with α ∈ N and β ∈ (N ∪ T ) * , and S ∈ N is the initial state.
With this definition, one can proceed to define the language recognized by the grammar, and its properties. In the case of ontology, to the best of my knowledge, the artifact that forms the focus of the discipline has no widely accepted structural definition; researchers are building a huge edifice based on a formal structure without knowing what that structure is. * * * Many researchers in ontology are blissfully unaware of the fact that their discipline rests on such weak foundations, but not all. One interesting attempt at a formal foundation of ontology was made in Guarino (1998). Guarino's starting point is the notion of intensional relation. Consider a relation such as [above](x, y) (which contains all pairs x, y such that x is above y). One can consider a set of objects, say a, b, c, and d, and create a relation,
which states that a is above b and d, and b is above d. This definition makes the concept "above" dependent on the specific configuration of a, b, c, and d: if b were above a, instead of a being above b, the relation would change. This extensional notion of "aboveness" is in this sense unsatisfactory: the concept of one thing being above another should be independent of the particular world configuration that we are analyzing, and of what is above what in any specific instance of the relation. Guarino seeks a way out of this impasse with the introduction of the notion of intensional relation.
Let D be a set of elements. An n-ary relation on D is a subset of D n and therefore the set of all n-ary relations on D is 2 D n . Let W be a collection of possible worlds, that is, grosso modo, a collection of legal configurations of the elements of D. An intensional relation r is an assignment, to each world in W of a relation (n-ary, in this example) on D, that is, an intensional relation is a function
So, given a world w in which a is above b and nothing else is above anything, we would have
Given a logical language L(V ) built on a vocabulary V , the standard definition of an (extensional) model for L(V ) is a pair (D, R)---where D is a set, and R a collection of relations on D---such that V can be mapped to D and predicates of L to elements of R.
Similarly, Guarino defines an intensional model for a language by replacing R with a set of intensional relations. An intensional model for L(V ) can be seen then as a function that maps any possible world w to an extensional model for the language relative to that world.
This intensional interpretation of a language is also called an ontological commitment. An ontonomy (my term, of course, not Guarino's) is then defined as follows:
Given a language L, with ontological commitment K, an [ontonomy] for L is a set of axioms designed in a way such that the set of its models approximates as best as possible the set of intended models of L according to K 2
There are three ways in which this definition is unsatisfactory, at least as a computing science theory (the definition has a certain philosophical interest, but this is besides the point in a computing milieu).
Firstly, the notion of intensional relation owes an obvious debt to the Kripkean notion of possible worlds, but with some important distinguo. In Kripke, possible worlds are formal models indexed by a variable that corresponds to a degree of modality. A predicate is true model. In the case of Guarino's definition, however, one has to resort to the notion of possible worlds in order to define extensional relations, which implies that extensional relations can't be expressed in the world (if they were, the extensional relations would be logically prior to the intensionals, and the latter could not be used to define the former).
But, if this is the case, no possible world can have any structure, and not only can't possible worlds be used as a model in the Kripkean sense, but they can't even induce an extensional relation. To put it in a different way: given a formal world of blocks, in order to instantiate the extensional relation [above] , one needs to know whether block a is above block b; but the only way in which this can be known is to check whether (a, b) ∈ [above]: the worlds that one needs in order to define the intensional relation can only have structure by virtue of the extensional relations that the intensional ones are supposed to define. We are stuck in the middle of a circular argument. All this does not necessarily imply that intensional relations do not exist, but it does imply that, whetever they are, they are not the functions from worlds to extensional relations that the model requires or that, if they are, they are not logically prior to extensional relations and thyerefore can't be used to define them.
Secondly, an ontology is defined as a system of axioms that defines (approximately, but this will be my third point) the set of models of a language L. On one hand, this definition leaves one with the complete freedom to choose the logic system in which these axioms are defined while, on the other hand, it makes an ontonomy dependent on the choice of the language L. Given this latitude, it is not clear whether this definition defines anything worth defining. In order to dispense with the dependency on the language L (which runs quite against the common notion of ontonomy), one could say that an ontonomy is a system of axioms for which there is a language L such the axioms define the same set of models as the ontological commitment of L. But, presumably, for every non-contradictory set of axioms it is possible to define such a language so the definition would reduce simply to the statement that an ontonomy is any set of statement in a formal language. Such a definition is formally correct, but it is also so generic as to be of no use.
Thirdly, we have the presence of the word "approximates." With this addendum, any system of statements that admits at least one model that is also a model for a language L is an ontonomy for L. If we abstract from the language, then any set of statements that admits at least a model is an ontonomy. In particular, any set of tautologies is an ontology. Allowing for approximation, in other words, worsens the problem considered in the previous point: the definition is formally consistent, but too broad to be of any use: many things, from a C program to a well structured grocery list, to a tax return form would qualify.
To this, one should add that Guarino's definition is not innocent of functionalism: given a set of statements in a certain logic system the only thing that makes them into an ontonomy is their intended use: if the statements are used to provide models consistent with an ontological commitment, then they form an ontonomy, otherwise they don't. This is not a Definition 2.1. Given a set V (of elements called terms) and a collection R of relations, and ontonomy for V and R (or (V, R)-ontonomy) is a decidable logical theory for V and R.
That is, an ontonomy is, roughly, a set of terms V , a collection of relations oer this set, and a collection of propositions (axioms) in some decidable logical system. Decidability seems to be more of a pragmatic concern than a theoretical one: I can't think of any principled reason why an ontonomy shouldn't be undecidable. Nevertheless, practitioners seem to give decidability a lot of importance, and what I am trying to do here is to formalize the common ideas about ontonomies.
There is more, though. The terms in an ontonomy are not supposed to represent individuals but, in a sense, universal: an ontologist would say that they represent concepts. I have quite a number of objections to move to this statement---and I will dedicate the next section to them---but for the moment we can assimilate concepts (with an extensional semantics) to data types and say that, at the very least, it must be possible to interpret the symbols of an ontonomy as sets. We can then attempt the following definition:
Definition 2.2. Given a set V (of elements called terms) and a collection R of relations, and ontonomy for V and R (or (V, R)-ontonomy) is a decidable logical theory O on V and R that admits a model M such that M |= O and, for each v ∈ V , M (v) is a set.
This definition seems to be more in line with what people think about when they talk about ontonomies. Consider the relation subclass X ≺ Y . in an extensional semantics the basis for this relation is subsethood, so we might want to include two statements in the theory:
i) every X is also an Y ;
ii) every statement that an ontonomy contains regarding the properties of the properties of the term Y applies, ipso facto to X.
We can formulate these points with the following expressions:
Unfortunately, in so doing, we have introduced enough machinery from monadic second order logic (and this only because I have only considered monadic propositions) that the logic is no longer decidable. The solution adapted by most ontologists hinges on two specializations: i) Instead of capturing certain properties of the relation through some general construct of the logic, these are defined as special operators with pre-defined semantics. So, for instance, the general properties of subclasshood expressed by the two propositions above are, by those whose approach is based on description logic, hidden in the interpretation of the symbol . In this way one can express certain speccific predicates of a general validity in a controlled way, without the use of symbols of broad applicability that would make the logic undecidable.
ii) The very relation ∈ between an element and the set to which it belongs is eliminated by making it implicit, by an Heideggerian "bracketing", so to speak. To take the example of description logic again, the formulas are written only with the use of the "terms" of the ontonomy, that is, only in terms of sets or data types. An expression such as a b means that a is a subclass of b, but nothing in the logic explicitly declares what this means in terms of the elements that belong to a.
So, definition 2, while superficially satisfactory, fails to take into account the simplifications and the approximations that people almost automatically associate to an ontonomy. The problem, of course, is that, on one hand, these simplifications and assumptions are so entrenched in the vox populi about ontology that it is doubtful that an ontonomy can be defined without making reference to them while, on the other hand, they are left unspoken, and it is not at all clear that---in a formal lamguage---they can be spoken. In summary, definition 2 is indeed a formal definition of something, but on whether this something conforms to the popular notion of ontonomy doubts abound.
SEMANTICS
Amidst the general indifference, then, a definition of ontonomy still eludes us. Yet, computing professionals make wide use of artifacts that they call "ontologies" (and that I call ontonomies) in a number of problems that we can divide in two broad classes.
On one hand, we have well specified and conceptually delimited syntactic problems, the prototypical examples of which are data and schema integration (Lenzerini, 2002) . In this case, ontonomies are collections of axioms used to establish certain relations between symbols that appear either in data bases or in their schemas. Applications of ontonomies in this area are enjoying a certain level of success and are well on their way to become one of the various instruments with which the data base and data integration professional can carry out their work. On the other hand there is the much more ambitious programme to use ontology as the chief instrument to encode the meaning of texts in a formal language in such a way that it can be analyzed by an algorithm. The prototype of this programme is the lavishly funded, heavily advertized (and even more heavily hyped) semantic web. While the first cass of applications make a fairly well understood use of the ontological artifacts (despite, as we have seen, a very uncertain definition of what these artifacts actually are), the second class raises some serious problematic regarding the nature of meaning and the process of signification.
This section and the following are a discussion on this second class of applications and, in particular, on the programme of the semantic web. I will declare at the outset that, by and large, the discussion on semantics that will follow does not represent an indictment of the first class of applications, expect inasmuch as they make semantic claims. In general, they are concerned with rather technical syntactic problems.
But the semantic web is different. The semantic web makes claims that are unavoidably and unapologetically semantics, and that concern the process of signification. These are quintessentially philosophical problems and, if the web semanticians want to make claims in this area, they have to be prepared to defend them on philosophical ground. A purely technical justification will not do in this case. If a computing scientist writes a program to solve a problem in, say, chemistry, the program will have to be justified and evaluated on chemical terms, using the language, the principles, and the practices of chemistry.
Similarly, if a computing scientist enters the area of signification, he will have to justify his work on philosophical grounds. The main philosophical claim of the semantic web is that ontonomies contain concepts and relations between them. The idea is not immediately obvious:
ontonomies, just like any other formal system, contain symbols, and one should wonder what makes these symbols into concepts. This is the problem that I will discuss in this section.
It is worth reminding that, when we are talking about semantics in the context of ontology, we are talking about something very different than the semantics of a programming language, which is the concept with which most computing scientists are familiar. In programming languages, the (denotational, say) semantic of a program is simply a function from states to states of a certain abstract machine 3 . The semantics of a program is formal, abstract, well defined, and has nothing to do (except the name) with the semantics of a text. In ontology, the semantic that is modeled is ostensibly the semantics of the social group of which the system is part, that is, the relation between the data in an information system and the symbols of an ontology is supposed to be isomorphic to the signification relation between signifier and signified in language. Therefore, while the development of a theory of programming language semantics doesn't require any cognitive endorsement, the assertion that there is a computational discipline of ontology requires the endorsement of a theory of signification. Unlike programming language semantics, information system semantics (and ontology with it) is not theoretically innocent, so to speak. Let us ignore, for the time being, the definitional difficulties of the last section, and take the view that an ontonomy is a set of symbols, a collection of relations among them, and a collection of axioms that relates them. There are many questions to be settled if one wants to defend the statement that these symbols are concepts. Even without questioning the nebulous reification implicit in any statement of the form "x is a concept" (and this, admittedly, is already a lot to swallow, as plenty there would be to question), one can start by asking some simpler questions. For example, one might ask whether the relations are constitutive of the concepts or not. A negative answer leads to an atomismà la Fodor, while a positive answer leads to a point of view resembling very much what Fodor himself calls inference rôle semantics. I will begin by assuming that the answer is negative, that is that conceptual atomism is the theory of choice. * * *
The possibility that symbols signify "per se" that is, independently of the relations between them, requires the endorsement of a very strong form of conceptual atomism that, as far as I can tell, is stated with the necessary degree of precision only in Fodor's informational semantics :
Informational semantics denies that "dog" means dog because of the way it is related to other linguistic expressions [...] . Correspondingly, informational semantics denies that the concept DOG has its content in virtue of its position in a network of conceptual relations 4 .
The "correspondingly" here does a lot of work, and requires a fairly important metaphisical investment since it maps conceptual structures to linguistic ones. This, passim, is the same investment that ontology requires when it takes a linguistic structure (constituted of words and relations) and calls it a conceptual model. Informational semantics has to struggle hard to eradicate itself from radical nativism: the position according to which all concepts are innate. The reasons why this is the case is of some interest visà vis the theoretical presuppositions of ontology.
Representational theories of mind are, one way or the other, committed to a cognitivist view of concept possession---having a concept is knowing something ---and to a form of inductive learning---learning requires creating and testing hypotheses about the property by which things fall under a given concept. But, plainly, atomic concepts can't be had that way. Fodor's way out of this impasse is to deny the cognitivist account of concept possession:
having a concept is not, after all, knowing something. For Fodor, acquiring a concept means "getting nomologically locked to the property that the concept represents" 6 and the way to acquire a concept is having the right kinds of experiences. So, if one doesn't want to throw away the conceptual atomism baby together with the radical nativism bath water, the problem that one faces is "why is it so often experience with doorknobs, and so rarely experience with whipped cream or giraffes, that leads one to lock to doorknobhood?" 7
Explanations that rely on hypothesis testing get back to the standard representational theory of mind, and are incompatible with atomism, so they can't be applied. Fodor's solution to this problem is to stipulate that doorknobhood is constituted by how its strikes us, viz.
"being a doorknob is having the property that minds like ours come to resonate to in consequence to relevant experience with stereotypical doorknobs" 8 The most evident flaw of this notion is that, since it needs to avoid any oppositional or structural definition of meaning in order to save atomism, it can't take into account the dependence of a single concept on the way in which different cultures divide the semantic field. To stay on Fodor's example, the English words "doorknob" and "door handle" correspond (roughly) to the Italian words "pomello" and "maniglia." But the areas covered by these concepts are not the same: Here too, in order to save atomism and the nomological relation between concepts and world that goes with it, one should explain why it is that Italian, Spanish, and French minds resonate differently with age and, this, of course, by making reference only to the relation between individual concepts and the state of affairs in the world: differential or oppositional explanations related to the semantic field are not allowed by atomism.
One doesn't even have to resort to interlingual examples to evidence these effects: any language contains examples in which the same term has different meanings depending on the distinct differential relations in which different linguistic sub-cultures place it with respect to other terms. If we are outside of a theater and see two old ladies comment that the play they just saw was "wocked," we can safely assume that they didn't like it, probably because they found it immoral. If the same comment is made by two adolescent boys donning a baseball uniform, we can assume that they liked it quite a bit 10 . These variations in the use of a term are not an accident, but an essential part of any language.
These problems come from atomism but, in computational ontology, they are compounded by a common confusion between signification and designation : the general idea in ontology seems to be that A means B if and only if A designates B. It is important however to keep the distinction between the two and, for this, I will just consider a famous example from Husserl (1993, p. 47) : the winner at Jena/the loser at Waterloo. We notice that the meaning of these two phrases is different, although their designatum is the same: Napoleon.
Although these points are rather muddled in most of the ontological literature, the positions of ontologists are quite close to those of atomism. The main affinity derives from the fact that semantics in ontology is extensional through and through and, more often than not, is based on Tarskian semantics. Tarski explicitly states the semantic connection between a language and a metalanguage through his "Convention T":
for a definition of truth in the metalanguage of a language L to be adequate it must have for its consequences all sentences of L which are obtaines from the expression 'x is true of and only if p' by substituting for x a name or structural description of any sentence of L and for p the expression which is the translation of that sentence into the metalanguage. (Tarski, 1944) We find this notion of semantics at the cognitive level in Fodor's atomism, as in the example "Tom is Armenian" is true if [f] it obtains that Tom is Armenian.
This is quite consistent with Fodor's notion of language of thought, which can act as the metalanguage (in the Tarskian sense) of natural language, but this cognitive semantics ignores the cultural dependencies of the statement: Tom might be born in 1960 and still consider himself a Soviet citizen, or may have been born in 400 B.C. in the region that today is
Armenia. There are political issues such as those deriving from making such a statement in a country that doesn't recognize Armenia (this point would be more poignant were Tom Palestinian), or painful ones, such as the ones that obtain if Tom lives in Nagorno-Karabahk.
There are issues of power, such as those connected to the rights to declare citizenship (I am an Italian because I was born one, but I am an American because a judge pronounced certain words), and so on. This concept of semantics, absolutely indispensible for the reductionist programme of the semantic web is so weak that even the philosophical current that originates with Tarski, the Anglo-American philosophy of language has rejected it. Quine, in direct polemic with verificationism (Carnap, 1950) , which is derived directly from Tarskian semantics, arrives to the conclusion that there is no correlation between single sentences and the external world experiences which confirms or disconfirms them; rather "statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body" (Quine, 1953) . Beliefs (propositions) and concepts in Quine form a network of relations in which the sensorial data form a sourt of a "boundary condition" that constraints terms more or less depending on their "proximity" to the "periphery" of the network; the meaning of any term can be changed re-arranging the network accordingly. A similar argument from a different perspective is also made by Putnam (1988) These facts point quite strongly away from atomism that is, away from the (admittedly naïve)
hypothesis that a symbol in an ontonomy possesses meaning qua symbol, by virtue of its name alone, without reference to the other elements of the ontonomy 11 . We are thus led to considering the second hypothesis given in the opening of this section, namely that the relations that one finds in an ontonomy are constitutive of meaning. Consider, for instance, 11 This is not conceptual atomismà la Fodor---which is all but naïve---, but the naïve interpretation that of it has been given in computing science. the following ontonomy:
The meaning of the word "car" is not given here by the juxtaposition of the three letters /c/, /a/, and /r/, but by its (structural) relation with the terms "motorvehicle," "roadvehicle,"
"size," and "small," together with the relation of these terms with other terms and so on. In other words, one can say that the meaning of the word "car" is given by the following schema
(where D is the definendum), which we can represent by the following diagram
The meaning of the word "car" is to be found in the structure of this definition that is, essentially, in the previous diagram.
Replacing D with "car" in (5), we obtain the structural meaning of the concept CAR. (Here I am using capitalization to denote concepts and words in quotes to denote linguistic entities;
a Saussurean semiotician would say that "car" is a signifier and CAR the corresponding signified.)
The problem with the position that the structure (5) is the meaning of the word "car" (that is, to be completely clear, that (5) is CAR) comes from the following structure:
which is isomorphic to (5), that is, to CAR. Unless one is ready to concede that CAR = DOG (and I expect quite a few people to object to this identification on ground of affection either toward their poodle or toward their BMW), one must admit that there is something wrong in our definition.
The structural definition of meaning can be saved, in this circumstance, by noticing that quadrupeds are animals, while road vehicles with four wheels are not necessarily motor vehicles (a horse-drawn cart, a small omnibus, or one of those four wheels bicycles that are often rented out at seaside resorts are examples of road vehicles with four wheels but no engine) so, in (7) we can affirm
and change the first two relations to
If this new structure is still not enough to differentiate between different concepts, we can add more predicates. The question is: when can we stop? The answer is that we can't: if meaning is in the structure (and we have already ruled out the hypothesis that meaning is in the symbols themselves), then the meaning of a sign is given by the trace on it of all the other signs of the language, and no part of the system can self-sustain once detached from the whole. * * *
The question, then, is whether an all-encompassing collection of logic formulas, in which every word of the language is put in relation with every other word, is sufficient to save inferential rôle semantics and, maybe, ontology with it. If this is the case then, even in the face of the impossibility of building such a general collection of relations, one can at least hope that, in practice, reduced sets can give a reasonable approximation of meaning.
This approximability is far from granted but, in any case, the opposite is true: if inferential rôle semantics can't be saved even by the complete set of relation, there is no hope that the foundations of ontology can be saved. This is an important point, oten overlooked in the discussions about the pragmatic approximation that computational semantics is supposed to be, so I will clarify it better. Ontologists do recognize that a general, all-encompassing formalization of language semantics might be impractical (although projects such as Cyc (Lenat, 1995) attempt precisely this); they argue, however, that for many practical applications in delimited areas, a reasonable approximation with a manageable "chunk" of ontology should suffice (an example later on will show that this hypothesis might be plagued by excessive optimism, and delimitating an area with a clear boundary seems to me an already complicated matter, but I will not delve into these problems right now). This position, however, rests on the notion that the approximated ontonomy is the approximation of something that, at least inprinciple, works: if the conceptual all-encompassing ontonomy doesn't work at least in principle, not even its approximation will. So, apart from practical impossibilities, the feasibility of reduced, approximate ontonomies rests on the conceptual possibility of a complete ontonomy.
One important assumption in ontology---and in the representational theories of mind---is that meaning exists independently of the language in which a text is written, and of the act of (there is a difference in the placement of noise between the two model that I will consider shortly). In this model, the origin of the communicative act is a meaning that resides wholly with the author, and that the author wants to express in a permanent text. This meaning is a-historical, immutable, and pre-linguistic. In order to communicate meaning, the author translates it into the shared code of language, and sends it to the receiver. The model acknowledges that this translation may be imperfect, a phenomenon indicated by the "noise" arrow entering the translation box; a contingent imperfection, due to the accidental imperfections of human languages. A perfect language (ontology acknowledges that this might be an unattainable theoretical limit) would be the perfect mirror of the essential meaning as it appears in the mind of the author and ipso facto allow a perfect translation. Be it as it may, once meaning is translated into language, it can be delivered to the reader, who can then proceed to decode it (maybe with the insertion of some more noise) obtaining a reasonable approximation of the original meaning as intended by the author. This model of meaning is necessary for the ontological enterprise because it is the only one that allows meaning to be assigned to a text, and recorded in a formal language other than the natural language, from which it can be extracted through automatic means following a schema like this (I have omitted the noise for the sake of simplicity):
In order to maintain this model, meaning must be a-historical (it is set once and for all and assigned to the text), pre-linguistic (it exists prior to its encoding in language), and depending entirely on an intentional act of the author. Ontology needs the meaning to be a-historical because the interpretation act (the upper-right-hand side of the diagram) is algorithmic and its results depend only on the text, without any contribution from the interpretation process: if ontology is to realize its programme, it is necessary that meaning be encoded, once and for all, in the formula, and that the interpretation always give the same result on the same formula. Meaning must be pre-linguistic, since language is only an instrument to register meaning that exists prior to and independently of it so that it can be communicated: were meaning to depend on language, it would be impossible to encode it in an alternative way, such as an ontology formula. Finally, if meaning is to be encoded on the "production" side (the left-hand side of the diagram), it must be wholly dependent on an act of the author, without the possibility of participation of the reader in an exchange that creates, rather than simply register, meaning. Ontology, in other words, needs to commit to a pre-linguistic theory of meaning of a certain Husserlian flvaour, such as one can find expressed in Hirsch (1967) . Meaning, for Hirsch, is exactly what ontology needs it to be: an "essence" that lies entirely with the author; it is the intentional state of the author at the time of writing. It is possible that the same text may "mean" different things to different people at different times, but this is merely a matter of the text's "significance" for a person rather than its immanent "meaning". The fact that I can read the Canterbury tales as a parody of a trip to a shopping mall doesn't mean that this is what Chaucer had in mind: the meaning of the Canterbuty tales is not what I read in it, but what Chaucer willed while writing it, and this meaning is absolute, immutable, and wholly resistent to historical change. Hirsch's hermeneutics denies the reader any kind of freedom to participate in the formation of meaning: the reader is a pure receptor whose purpose is to determine, as objectively as possible, the pre-linguistic intentional state of the author. That is not too clear what a pre-linguistic meaning is (can you close your eyes for a moment and "mean" something without the support of language?), that meaning might be indissolubly couched in language, and therefore necessarily participate in the public nature of language, is something that Hirsch's hermeneutic doesn't consider.
Hermeneutics, in its original acceptance, was concerned with the interpretation of the holy scriptures and, in this sense, it is easy to see how this unilateral view of meaning came about: the people who interpreted the scriptures believed that they were interpreting the word of God and to determine what the author meant, independently of the historical vicissitudes of the interpretation was understandably quite important to them. Of particular relevance for the issues of ontology are the theories of Nida about translation (Nida, 1964 ).
Nida (a minister, and translator of the Bible) assumed a model very similar to that of Hirsch, in which a deep meaning is encoded in a language for the purpose of communication. The language code is, of course, socially and historically situated. It may contain language-specific modisms (it might say, for instance, "what's eating you?"), and cultural references. The purpose of the translator is to read through this cultural superstratum to arrive at the underlying meaning, and then to perform a translation that reproduces, in the cultural schema of the target language, the same underlying meaning and the same cultural effects that the original text achieved on its original audience (e.g. by translating the abovementioned modism in French as "quelle mouche te pique?"). Computing scientists might recognize a certain homely flavor here, a Chomskian one:
[We have seen] the great echo that the ideas of Chomsky have in [Nida] . Since in every kind of speech we can distinguish two levels of structures, and since the first level---the thought, also called the deep structure---is common to the two languages under consideration, the American translation theorist deduces that the part that is actually transformed [in the translation] is the second level, or the superficial structure 12 But, as Moya (2004) observes, there is here (and in ontology as well) a great simplification of Chomsky: a whole level, that of the structural rules, has disappeared, not to mention that translation, as well as ontology, operate within a cultural context that Chomsky ignores because irrelevant to its purposes. This simplified Chomskian theory is what Ontology is trying to implement, with the additional assumption that the deep meaning can be encoded not just in another natural language, but in a formal one. All this translates in an authoritarian normativism, which denies any form of social construction of meaning, and any rôle to the reader, who is so unimportant that can be replaced by an algorithm. To the Barthesian "death of the author" ontology contraposes a dogmatic "death of the reader." The underlying ideology is that of meaning as a commodity and signification as a market exchange, an old pre-structuralist view associated with the bourgeois individualism: meaning belongs to the author, and language is just the currency that allows one to exchange this meaning-commodity with somebody who is also an owner of meaning.
Emphasis
Communicative act Note addresser emotive express a state of mind addressee conative trying to reach an effect context referential code metalinguistic discuss whether we understand each other medium phatic "we finally got to talk!" message poetic "O tite tute tati, tibi tanta..." The conclusions of most of the XX century philosophy, linguistics, and literary theory point in a very different direction: meaning is not something that pre-exist language and that is merely reflected or expressed by it: meaning is produced by language; we can only have meaning and experiences because we possess a language to have them in. Consequently, meaning can't be the completely private experience of the author (his private property) that ontology needs. Language is social, and the very possibility of having a meaningful experience is mediated by this social code, and it can happen only in the forms and within the canons permitted by this code, whose existence pre-dates the individual. One can no longer see an intentional act that pre-dates language and that language simply reflects (the essentialist view of the ontologists notwithstanding). Reality, and the writing subject, are the product of language, and just as language interacts with other social and cultural systems, so does the act of reading. It is reading---historically and conceptually situated---that constructs meaning connecting the cues that the text gives with the complex network of conventions, discourses, and situatedness in which it occurs.
We must be careful not to confuse the communication schema of ontology with Jackobson's formalization of the communicative act (Jackobson & Halle, 1956 ). through the act of saying ("I pronounce you man and wife", "the motion is dismissed"), or perlocutionary acts, which bring about an effect by saying (convincing, intimidating). The second is that, even if we stay in the area of statements, meaning is not a given, extra-linguistic departure point, but a result of the whole interaction. The instability of meaning, from which Hirsch and Nida tried to free themselves, and that is so problematic for ontology, is not accidental, but a part of the nature of language and, therefore, of meaning, which of language is a product. My reading of a text is not to be relegated to a mere personal significance---something more imperfect than the rotund, unchangeable meaning---: it is the very act that creates meaning, and understanding is always contextual and historically situated.
Just as language interacts with other social and cultural systems, so reading is not an act isolated from human activity. To exemplify, I will cite quite extensively an example from Eagleton (1996) Let me take, almost literally at random, the first two sentences of a novel: ' "What did you make of the new couple?" The Hanemas, Piet and Angela, were undressing.'
(John Updike, Couples.) What are we to make of this? We are puzzled for a moment, perhaps, by an apparent lack of connection between the two sentences, until we grasp that what is at work here is the literary convention by which we may attribute a piece of direct speech to a character even if the text does not explicitly do this itself. We gather that some character, probably Piet or Angela Hanema, makes the opening statement; but why do we presume this? The sentence in quotation marks might not be spoken at all: it may be a thought, or a question which someone had asked, or [...] a sudden voice from the sky. One reason why the latter solution seems unlikely is that the question is a little colloquial for a voice from the sky, and we might know that Updike is in general a realist writer who does not usually go for such devices [...] . It is unlikely on realist grounds that the question is asked by a chorus of people speaking in unison, and slightly unlikely that it is asked by somebody other than Piet and Angela Hanema, since we learn the next moment that they are undressing, perhaps speculate that they are a married couple, and know that married couples, in our suburb of Birmingham at least, do not make a practice of undressing together before third parties, whatever they might do individually.
Interpreting a text is not a one-directional act in which a reader is imbued with a meaning.
It is an iterative process: the text generates in the reader some initial speculations, a frame of reference in which we interpret what comes next. What comes next will change the frame of reference and force us to reinterpret what we read before; this will, again, change the frame of reference, and so on... Reading is an infinite process of adjustment and interpretation is the limit point of this culturally and historically situated cycle of framing and interpreting.
Reading is a dynamic process that acts retroactively on what one has already read, therefore the meaning of a fragment of text is never completed in itself, but it depends on what one has read before and also by what comes next. Meaning is never fully present in a sign, but it is scattered through the whole chain of signifiers, it is deferred, through the process that Derrida (1997) indicates with the neologism differànce, it is a dynamic process that takes plane on the syntagmatic plane of the text (Eco, 1979) . Ontology is a static entity. It contains fixed relations between words, relations that hold independently of the specific situations in which the word is used. It contains, in other words, paradigmatic relations.
Ontology needs meaning to be fully present in a word, be it through some characteristic of the word itself or through the relation of the word with other words. But this is not the way in which meaning is constructed. Meaning is not present in a word: it is the creation of the dynamic process of differànce in which the text acts as a sort of "boundary condition" that contraints reading and interpreting along certain directions.
Lest should you think that all this applies only to literature and not to the prosaic world in which ontology operates, let me take the most prosaic example I can think of: a sign on a door that says "trespassers will be prosecuted." The hermeneutical activity necessary to understand this sign is considerable. I must understand, for instance, that this sign is not informative in the sense that a newspaper headline is: I am not being informed that there have been trespassers somewhere and that they will be prosecuted sometime in the future: in western societies at least, information of this kind is not written on signs hanging from doors, especially if the sign is made of plastic or wood (and therefore is durable) and the writing is not dated. Such a sign typically is a prohibition, a threat; the word "trespasser" refers to me (the reader) in case I decide to walk through the door, and it threatens me of prosecution if I do so. The threat also implies that prosecution is likely to result in punishment. I must understand that trespassing in this context means to cross this door, not some door in the palace of the king of Siam. I have to have a general knowledge of private property to understand that preventing people from entering a building is one of the rights that society grants to proprietors (while, for instance, preventing people from looking at the building is in general not such a right), that there are authorities that will guarantee the respect of these rights, that they will punish people who infringe these rights, that the sign has been placed there with their tacit approval, and so on...
None of these elements, necessary for the interpretation of the sign, is in the text: they must be supplied by a specific situation. The text here takes meaning by being situated (viz.
placed in a situation: a door on a building rather than, say, a shelf on a store that sells signs, a situation in which the text would have a completely different meaning) and in a certain relation with other texts that are not present, namely the political discourse that regulate private property, the speech through which certain customs have been implanted in the reader, and so on. Finally, all this linguistic discourse and all this hermeneutuc activity rest on a substratum of human practices and action: the political relation of power between authority and citizens, and the fact that in order to understand punishment one must understand pain (psychological pain, at least).
There is more to meaning, in other words, than just relations between terms: the creation of signification is a back-and-forth process between the text and the reader; the reader, influenced by the text, creates a frame of reference in which the text itself can be given meaning. This is what Gadamer (1989) called the hermeneutic circle: the parts of the text can be understood in terms of the whole context, and the context becomes intelligible by means of the parts. The possibility of reaching a stable conclusion of the hermeneutic circle has been problematized by the post-structuralists, for which meaning, being couched in the slippery medium of language, is unstable (and so is the subject, which is also made of language), so that the possibility of reaching a meaning is in itself a chimers.
Apart from its use of a formal language, ontology tries to place the meaning of a text in the text itself and, in order to do so, it must break the hermeneutic circle transforming it into a straight line that carries meaning from the source to a recipient that can register it without the need of situated interpretation. In order to do this, as we have seen, ontology must commit to a view of meaning as a-historical and unsituated, an essentialist view in which meaning is to be found in an intentional act of an author, and interpretation consists only in Taken in this doubly unsustainable view, the authorial intention as the source of meaning, and the possibility to represent it in symbols and relations, the notion that ontonomies are semantic, in any reasonable sense of the word semantic, appears untenable to say the least.
The view from within
Some of the debate about the computational underpinnings of ontology---whether related to the semantic web or not---has been sporadically present in the computing science literature. Two general areas of computing abut, so to speak, the conceptual space of the semantic web:
knowledge representation and natural language processing, and it is in these area that most of the debate has taken place. People in natural language processing have been more critical of the semantic web or, at least, of certain incarnations of it. By and large, natural language processing people find that representing language with anything other than language itself is a problematic endeavor. we still find it perfectly acceptable to say that we "dial a number," although no dials are involved anymore, but a friend of mine who in a conversation made the iconic gesture of "dialing" caused a bit of a laughter among the youngest part of the audience and a few good-natured jokes about her age. Not only is language vague and vagrant, but the vagrancy and the assumptions of new meanings are not uniform across the different semiotic systems in which lamnguage can be expressed.
PRAGMATICS
The previous section suggested quite decisively, and I hope conclusively, that the ambitious semantic programme of ontology is unattainable. Yet, as we all know, ontonomies are eagerly sought after, to the point of being hailed as a cornerstone of the constituenda semantic web.
It is interesting to question why this is the case. Why is it that a lavishly funded, heavily publicized (and shamelessly hyped), technically gigantic effort can be built on such weak 13 Sparck Jones (2004) 14 I will be more generous than (Sparck Jones, 2004) and admit that, with a better logic machinery than that used or foreseen for the semantic web---a machinery that can deal with uncertainty---one might be able to add "circa 1670" to the information.
conceptual foundations? Why is all this done in the absence of a careful analysis of those foundations? A full answer to these questions would require a deep investigation of the sociology of the computing enterprise and of its relations with other economic forces, an analysis that is in the absolutest terms beyond the scope of this paper. I will venture only the briefest of comments.
We have already noticed that ontology endorses a pre-structurallist market notion of meaning, which is reified as the exclusive property of the author, not to be trespassed by the reader (trespassers will be prosecuted!). Far from being an active participant in a social process of signification, the reader is a mere purchaser of meaning, which is dispensed by the author in the shared currency of language, be it formal or natural. All this resonates well with the transformation of the internet from a public access channel for the free and open exchange of data---a public good---to a commercial vehicle, increasing parts of which are privately controlled. A philosophical position that sees meaning as a privately owned commodity---plausible or not---is obviously welcome in this environment, and works well with the supply-side, free market capitalist "cyberlibertarian" ideology that is becoming the dominant one on the internet (Winner, 1997) . This is an age in which intellectual property rights have been extended to areas and extremes that nobody would have dreamt of just a few decades ago, and the commodity view of meaning makes it conceptually possible to patent it and to restrict the possibilities of interpretation according to the strictures of intellectual property laws. The perspective is too lucrative for internet companies and "content owners" not to be very interested in ontology---and very supportive of it. It is not a surprise that the semantic web is these days probably the more fertile ground for the application of ontology.
It is also not surprising that the idea that meaning is to be sought in a series of taxonomies (naïve as it might be) should have arisen in an environment close to the programming profession, where taxonomies have been popularized as a programming discipline by object oriented methods: a lot of the ontological vocabulary, especially in the vicinity of the semantic web, shows a definite debt to that of the programming profession with notions such as classes, sub-classes, and attributes. But the codification of a computerized taxonomy in a social group can be a mixed blessing. Computers are very pervasive instruments, and their undebated usefulness for many activity has created a strong social pressure to use them, regardless of their effectiveness for the specific task at hand. In this situation, it is likely that an ontology will inherit the authoritarian imprint of the computer and establish itself, early and strongly, as a discipline's orthodoxy, stifling alternative discourses, which would come to be branded of Luddite anti-technologism. But the early establishment of a taxonomical orthodoxy, especially if done with the blunt instrument of ontology, may end up hampering the discipline to which it is applied. This is true especially for science, whose advancements are always tentative, and which requires a great fluidity of models, criteria, and mindsets. Whether a taxonomy is useful or harmful might depend on the state of the discipline to which it is applied. The taxonomy of Linneus was a great help for the relatively mature discipline of zoology, but the ontology of phrenology delayed the development of neurophysiology for decades. By forcing computerized data bases, normative semantics, and taxonomies on a vital but not yet settled discipline we might take away its vitality more than help it.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Lest there be any doubt, I am not claiming that the techniques developed for ontology and, more in general, for the area of digital semantics can't be of use. I can think of several problem in which good research work on collections of symbols and relations (or, if you prefer, on collections of decidable logic propositions) can be of considerable utility. One example that comes to mind is the creation of data bases in which the schema, as well as the data, can be queried; another is data integration (Garcia-Molina et al., 1997) . All these, it is worth remembering, are syntactic problems: no semantics is involved. The inadequacy of ontology doesn't come from its technical potential, but from the claims and practices that are associated to the discipline, starting from the misleadingly evocative name ontology. I know no recipe to fix ontology and, even if I had one, I think I made it quite clear in the previous pages that a discipline of ontology with the current semantic bent is not worth fixing. A few steps, however, could be taken in order to solve the three order of issues that I have outlined in the paper, and to redefine the discipline in a way that, I believe, will be ultimately more useful to computing science.
The formal problems of ontology are, in a sense, the eaiest to solve: ontology should be given a firm mathematical basis, with a clear definition of the artifacts that will form its object of study, and its relations with the other data.
The issue of semantics is more complex, and I hope that I have argued convincingly that whetever it is that can be put into a collection of formulas, it is not ipso facto the meaning of a text in any reasonable sense of the word. Ontology should abandon any velleity of defining meaning, or of dealing with semantics, and re-define itself as a purely syntactic discipline, much like the rest of computing activities. In this framework, there is a lot that the discipline can offer to help users discover the semantics of texts. It is clear, however, that this can't be done with the normativism of attaching a meaning to a text: ontology should simply be an instrument to facilitate the interaction of a user with the data, keeping in mind that the user's situated, contextual presence is indispensible for the creation of meaning. For instance, it would be a good idea to partially formalize the syntactic part of the interaction process that goes into the creation of meaning. Prof.
Ramesh Jain once mentioned to me a statement that he placed in a keynote speech (I am quoting from memory): "the user's personal ontology should interact with the general ontology." I disagree with his use of the term "ontology" because of the reasons I expressed in this paper, but his suggestion certainly goes in the right direction: it acknowledges the interactive nature of meaning formation.
Meaning is the limit point of a temporal, situated process, in which the text acts as a boundary condition and in which the user is, ex necessitate, the protagonist. Such a view is not completely new to computing science, having been explored, e.g. by emergent semantics Santini et al. (2001) ; Grosky et al. (2002) , a view of semantics in which the computer is just a syntactic instrument to aid the reader's own discovery of meaning. Whatever technical path ontology will take, it can continue claiming to be involved with semantics only if it will become an interactive syntactic instrument for the user. In this way the computer could become an instrument to enrich our own immersion in meaning, much like a book is, rather than a factor of impoverishment and banalization of the process of signification and of our intellectual life, as too often is the case.
Finally, it is necessary that ontologists remind themselves that they are working on a new discipline, that the solutions that they find are only first attempts, and that this is not the time to get locked into standards and resilient solutions that will stifle innovation. A (otherwise fairly good) book on the semantic web contains the following statement:
In summary, RDF has its idiosyncrasies and is not an optimal modeling language.
However, we have to live with the fact that it is already a de facto standard. 15 For such a young discipline, ontology is showing a surprising conservatism, immobility, and discouragement of alternatives. Had our professional forefathers shown such timidity and awestruck reverence for standards 40 years ago, we would still be programming in FORTRAN using the OS/360. Being ready to change and to question itself is part of the humility that these days computing science is in dire need of. We have become too accustomed to impose whatever solution we come up with to other disciplines, rather than listen to what they have to teach us.
CONCLUSIONS
Semantics (in the sense of information systems semantics) seems to have become a most powerful "buzz-word" in the computing profession (a profession that is becoming, alas, very responsive to hype and word clout), and ontology seems occasionally to ascend to the status of a panacea.
But, from within the point of view of computing science, there are at least two serious problems with this panacea.
The first is that, while we appear eager to use ontonomies in the most diverse applications, we are quite unable to define them with precision. More than a specific ontological problem, this issue is a symptom of a preoccupying relaxation of the standards of rigor of computing and, as such, should not be taken lightly, even from researchers not directly connected with ontology.
The second problem is in the idea of semantics to which ontology makes reference, an idea that is clearly insufficient in the light of all that is known about the process of signification.
In a sense, the choice of such a model of signification reveals a cultural autism, so to speak, of computing science, and a good deal of historical arrogance. The problem of signification has been studied at least since the debate between the Stoics and the Epicureans on the nature of the sign, has been an important concern in medieval philosophy, and has been absolutely central in the philosophy of the XX century. But, faced with the problem of signification, computing scientists chose to disregard all this and to start from zero.
Everything that doesn't come from within our boundaries can be safely ignored. Whether this is due to ignorance or arrogance it is equally inexcusable: the social implications of computing science in the age of the internet are too important to allow us to be either.
This problem---be it arrogance or ignorance---is not specific to computing science, but it appears to be fairly common among technologists: "High tech, in fact, appears not only as optimistic about the future but also more indifferent toward and, in other contexts, more manipulative of the past than earlier technologies have been" 16 . Computing science is trapped here in the very typical technological fallacy of considering history---cultural history, in this case, as "irrelevant save as the supposed contrast with the golden age ahead. It is as if high tech arrived and flourished in an historical vacuum of no more than a few decades and as if everything before it can simply be forgotten" 17 . But, of course, to think this way is illusory. The problem of signification and the viable relations between a syntactic manipulation device such as a computer and semantics are much more complex than the simple schematism of ontology would imply.
Given the importance that the presence of computing devices has in the disciplines in which they are used; given the influence that these devices have in promoting or constraining certain discourses in these disciplines, the computing profession has the responsibility of rejecting facile solutions. It has the responsibility of understanding the different perspectives on semantics, of being aware of the history of such problem and, ultimately, to re-analyze the relations between computers and the process of signification. Computers are syntactic machines, and it not immediately obvious that they can be of any help in dealing with semantics. The problem is worth exploring, but in a more subtle way, without prejudices, hidden agendas and a priori solutions: the first question should not be how to we use a computer to represent semantics, but whether we should do so. We computing professional must have the acumen to discover the answer, and the cultural humility to accept it, whatever it might be.
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